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Justice Delayed; Justice Denied? Causes and
Proposed Solutions Concerning Delays in
the Award of Veterans Benefits
Michael P. Allen*
ABSTRACT
As he turned his eyes toward leading the country into life after
the Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln famously called on
the nation to care for him who shall have borne the battle and
for his widow and his orphan.1 Sadly, President Lincoln would
not live to see how much Americans have heeded his call to
support our veterans. In many respects, this symposium is a
contemporary example of a continuing commitment to Lincolns
charge. From a variety of perspectives, the participants have
addressed the myriad ways in which our returning combat
veterans face legal, medical, political and social challenges as
they reintegrate into society. This important discussion
underscores that a conscious focus on the men  and today,
women  who serve in the military is as significant today as it
was in 1865.
My contribution to the symposium focuses on the difficulties
veterans face in obtaining benefits administered by the United
States Department of Veterans Affairs (the VA). These benefits
are an important part of Lincolns legacy. Indeed, the quotation
from President Lincolns second inaugural address adorns the
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Professor of Law, and Director, Veterans Law
Institute, Stetson University College of Law. B.A., 1989 University of Rochester; J.D.,
1992 Columbia University School of Law. I would like to thank the staff of the
University of Miami National Security and Armed Conflict Law Review for the invitation
to take part in this important symposium as well as for the professional and helpful
manner in which they have interacted with all of the participants.
1 President Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865).
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entryway at the VAs main headquarters in Washington.2 My
principal goal in this essay is to provide an overview of the
difficulties veterans face under the current system as well as to
consider what could be done to address these problems.3 Simply
put, American veterans are waiting far too long to obtain the
benefits to which they are entitled.
This essay proceeds in four parts. Part I sets forth a description
of the current system under which veterans apply for benefits
and appeal adverse decisions. As will become clear, the current
system is complex and overburdened with quite literally millions
of claims. Part I also provides statistics concerning the rampant
delays many veterans face as they pursue their claims for
benefits. Part II turns to the causes for the complexity of and
delays associated with the current veterans benefits system. As
Part II explains, the problems veterans face can, ironically
enough, be explained in significant measure by how much we as
a nation have heeded President Lincolns call. Part III discusses
approaches that could be taken to address the problems veterans
face in obtaining their benefits. There is no silver bullet, but Part
III lays out steps that could be taken to alleviate some of the
issues confronting veterans as we work towards a more global
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2 Ken McKinnon, To Care for Him Who Shall Have Borne the Battle, U.S. DEPT OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS (Mar. 4, 2015, 8:30 AM), http://www.blogs.va.gov/VAntage/17573/
care-shall-borne-battle/.
3 Throughout this essay I use the term veteran to refer to those people seeking VA
benefits. The category of potential claimants is actually larger, including certain spouses
and children. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 1316 (providing benefits to certain spouses and child
of veterans); 38 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1834 (concerning benefits available to certain children of
Vietnam veterans). The comments about the system, its problems, and potential solutions
are as applicable to the other claimants as to veterans themselves.
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I. THE VETERANS BENEFITS SYSTEM: STRUCTURE AND
WORKLOAD
A. The VA and the Benefits it Administers
It is not an exaggeration to state that a veteran seeking benefits
through the VA faces a daunting task. The VA is perhaps the definition
of a byzantine bureaucracy. It is the second largest federal cabinet
department with over 300,000 employees as of 2014.4 Indeed, the VAs
own attempt to describe itself resulted in a document over 350 pages
4 U.S. Dept of Veterans Affairs 2014 Functional Organization Manual  v.2.0a at 11,
http://www.va.gov/ofcadmin/docs/VA_Functional_Organization_Manual_Version_2.0a.
pdf.
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long.5 According to the VA, it provides services at 151 medical centers,
8209 community-based outpatient clinics, 300 vet centers, 56 regional
offices, and 131 national and 90 state or tribal cemeteries.6 Veterans can
certainly be forgiven by being intimidated by what could accurately be
described as a giant maze.
On a gross level, one can think of the VA as being focused on three
major missions represented by three administrations within the
department: medical care; cemeteries/burial; and general benefits
unrelated to medical care or burial.7 This essay focuses on those parts of
the VA dealing with benefits, principally through the Veterans Benefits
Administration or VBA.
Title 38 of the United States Code provides a wide array of benefits
to which veterans are entitled.8 The most common form of veterans
benefit, and the one on which this essay will principally focus, is service-
connected disability compensation.9 Essentially, this benefit provides
monthly monetary payments to veterans for injuries or illnesses
connected to the veterans military service.10 A veteran will be entitled to
such benefit if she establishes that she qualifies as a veteran,11 suffers
5 See generally id.
6 Id. at 11.
7 Id. at 13. The three entities within the VA focusing on these areas are the Veterans
Health Administration, the National Cemetery Administration, and the Veterans Benefits
Administration.
8 The range of benefits available to veterans is truly staggering. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C.
§§ 1101-1163 (Compensation for Service-Connected Disability or Death); §§ 1301-
1323 (Dependency and Indemnity Compensation for Service-Connected Deaths);
§§ 1501-1562 (Pension for Non-Service Connected Disability or Death for Service);
§§ 1701-1787 (Hospital, Nursing Home, Domiciliary, and Medical Care); §§ 1801-
1834 (Benefits for Children of Vietnam Veterans and Other Veterans); §§ 1901-1988
(Insurance); §§ 2001-2066 (Benefits for Homeless Veterans); §§ 2301-2308 (Burial
Benefits); §§ 3001-3035 (All-Volunteer Force Educational Assistance Program);
§§ 3100-3122 (Training and Rehabilitation for Veterans with Service-Connected
Disabilities); §§ 3201-3243 (Post-Vietnam Era Veterans Educational Assistance);
§§ 3301-3325 (Post-9/11 Educational Assistance); §§ 3701-3765 (Housing and Small
Business Loans); §§ 4100-4114 (Job Counseling, Training, and Placement Service for
Veterans); and §§ 4211-4215 (Employment and Training of Veterans).
9 For example, in its most recent statement concerning the benefits it administers, the
VA noted that it provided disability compensation to over 4 million people. This
compared to about a half million people receiving pensions and about 1.1 million people
receiving education benefits. See 2014 Performance and Accountability Report, U.S.
DEPT. OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, pt. I-9 (Nov. 2014), http://www.va.gov/budget/docs/report
/2014-VAparFullWeb.pdf.
10 See Veterans Benefits Manual §3.1.1 at 57 (Barton F. Stichman, Ronald B. Abrams
& Louis J. George, eds., 2014).
11 38 U.S.C. § 101(2) (defining a veteran as a person who served in the active
military, naval, or air service, and who was discharged or released therefrom under
conditions other than dishonorable.).
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from a current disability (not the result of drug or alcohol abuse), and
that disability is connected to an injury, event or illness occurring during
the veterans time in the military.12 This latter concept  the connection
between a current condition and an in-service event, is often referred to
as nexus.13 Thus, a veteran who injured her left knee when jumping out
of an aircraft during service would be able to receive compensation for
the knee injury if she had medical evidence of her knee condition, factual
evidence of the parachute jump, and medical evidence linking these two
things. And the person who saw horrific events while in-service could
establish an entitlement to benefits for post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD).14 The latter situation is certainly more complex than the former,
but the concept is the same.
There are far more complexities in the process than are apparent by
this brief description of how a veteran establishes an entitlement to
service-connected disability compensation.15 However, the information is
sufficient for one to now consider the process by which a veteran
attempts to obtain such a benefit within the VA system.
B. The Benefits Process
1. The Administrative Process
A veteran wishing to receive benefits begins her journey at one of
the VAs Regional Offices (RO, also called the agency of original
jurisdiction) either by filing the claim physically at such location or
submitting a claim through a VA online system.16 If a veteran obtains the
12 See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131; see also Washington v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 362,
367 (2005), citing Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995), affd 78 F.3d 604 (Fed.
Cir. 1996).
13 See e.g., Veterans Benefits Manual, supra note 10 at § 3.4 (discussing nexus
requirement).
14 See generally Veterans Benefits Manual, supra note 10 at § 3.6 (discussing special
regime in place for PTSD claims).
15 For example, a veteran can establish service connection for certain conditions based
on secondary service-connection. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.310 (providing in relevant part:
disability which is proximately due to or the result of a service-connected disease or
injury shall be service connected. When service connection is thus established for a
secondary condition, the secondary condition shall be considered a part of the original
condition.). So, the veteran in the example in the text who injured her left knee in
service could also be secondarily service-connected for a right hip condition if there was
medical evidence sufficient to establish that the left knee injury caused the veteran to
walk with a gait that, thereafter, caused a right hip problem.
16 See U.S. Dept of Veterans Affairs, www.benefits.va.gov/COMPENSATION/
apply.asp (last visited May 1, 2015) (providing claimants with instructions about filing an
initial claim for benefits); see also Veterans Benefits Manual, supra note 10 at § 12.1
(providing overview of initial filing of claims).
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benefits she seeks, the process comes to an end. But a veteran might be
denied benefits or otherwise be dissatisfied with the ROs decision.17 In
such a situation, the veteran is statutorily entitled to an appeal within the
agency.18
The administrative appeal process is a multi-step one.19 It begins
with a veteran indicating her intent to appeal by filing a Notice of
Disagreement (NOD) with the RO.20 The veteran has one-year from the
date of mailing of the decision with which the claimant disagrees.21 The
NOD does not perfect a veterans appeal. Instead, the filing of that
document triggers an obligation of the RO either to alter its decision or to
prepare a Statement of the Case (SOC).22 An SOC is designed to
provide the veterans with additional information about the basis for the
decision, including a summary of the evidence, a statement of the
relevant law, and why given those items the decision at issue was
made.23
After all of this one would assume that the matter is set for
administrative appeal. But the veteran has still not perfected her appeal.
To do so, within sixty days of when the SOC is mailed to her, she must
submit a formal appeal.24 This formal appeal is done by completing VA-
Form 9.25
The veterans appeal is determined by an entity within the VA
independent of the Veterans Benefits Administration, the Board of
Veterans Appeals (Board).26 The Board is comprised of a Chairperson
17 In addition to being denied a benefit outright, a veteran could be dissatisfied with a
variety of other decisions. For example, the veteran might believe she is entitled to an
effective date for benefits earlier than the RO assigned. See 38 U.S.C. § 5110.
Alternatively, the veteran might disagree with the amount of monthly compensation the
RO awarded, a concept known as a rating decision. See 38 U.S.C. § 1155.
18 See 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a) (providing that veterans are entitled to one appeal to the
secretary [of the Department of Veterans Affairs] when denied benefits).
19 The VA provides a basic description of the multistage appeals process in a booklet
available on the internet. See How Do I Appeal? (Apr. 2002), www.bva.va.gov/docs/
Pamphlets/010202A.pdf.
20 38 U.S.C. § 7105(a)(b). The veteran may also seek review by a more senior RO
employee at this stage, a Decision Review Officer (DRO). See 38 C.F.R. § 3.2600. Use of
the DRO procedure is optional and does not affect the discussion in the text. Accordingly,
I will generally refer to the RO in this essay without specifying whether a DRO is
involved. For more information concerning the DRO process, see Veterans Benefits
Manual, supra note 10, at § 12.8.1.
21 38 U.S.C. § 7105(b)(1).
22 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(1).
23 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(1)(A)-(C).
24 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(3).
25 See How Do I Appeal?, supra note 19 at 6. The form itself can be found online. See
www.va.gov/vaforms/va/pdf/va9.pdf.
26 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a).
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appointed by the President of the United States, a Vice-chairperson, and
a sufficient number of Board Members (or Veterans Law Judges) to
consider appeals.27 The Board bases its decision on the entire record of
the proceeding and upon consideration of all evidence and material of
record and applicable law and regulation.28 Unlike most appellate
processes, a veteran may submit additional evidence to the Board in
connection with her appeal.29 A final Board decision concludes the
administrative process.
2. The Judicial Process
Until 1988, the Boards decision was the end of the matter; veterans
were prohibited from obtaining judicial review of a VA decision
concerning benefits.30 That changed with the passage of the Veterans
Judicial Review Act (VJRA).31 The VJRA created a federal court today
known as the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
(CAVC).32 Thus, today a veteran may seek further review of a decision
denying benefits outside the administrative process by appealing to the
CAVC.33 The veteran must file her notice of appeal with the CAVC
27 38 U.S.C. § 7101; see generally U.S. Dept of Veterans Affairs, Board of Veterans
Appeals Annual Report, 3-4 (2013) (describing structure of Board), www.bva.va.gov/
docs/Chairmans_Annual_Rpts/BVA2013AR.pdf (hereinafter 2013 BVA Report). The
2013 Report is the most recent one available from the Board.
28 See 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a).
29 See Statement of Ms. Laura H. Eskenazi, Executive in Charge and Vice Chairman,
Board of Veterans Appeals, Veterans Dilemma: Navigating the Appeals System for
Veterans Claims, House Comm. on Veterans Affairs (Jan. 22, 2015),
http://veterans.house.gov/witness-testimony/laura-h-eskenazi-esquire (hereinafter
Eskenazi Statement).
30 See 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1988 ed.) (current version at 38 U.S.C. § 511). There was a
narrow exception to this bar for constitutional claims. See also Johnson v. Robison, 415
U.S. 361, 366-74 (1974).
31 Veterans Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687; 102 Stat. 4105 (1988). For a
general discussion of the VJRA and the advent of judicial review in this context, see
Michael P. Allen, Significant Developments in Veterans Law (2004-2006) and What They
Reveal About the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 40 U.MICH. J. OF LAW REFORM 483, 486-491 (2007).
32 The CAVC was originally named the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans
Appeals. Id. at § 4051, 102 Stat. 4105, 4113 (1988). The courts name was changed in
1998. Veterans Programs Enhancement Act of 1988, Pub L. No. 105-368 § 511(b), 112
Stat. 3315, 3341 (1998). Congress created the CAVC under its Article I powers. See 38
U.S.C. § 7251. The CAVC is comprised of judges appointed by the President of the
United States with the advice and consent of the Senate to serve fifteen-year terms. See
38 U.S.C. § 7251(a)-(c). The CAVCs website contains additional information
concerning the courts history. See www.uscourts.cavc.gov/history.php.
33 See 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a) (setting forth the jurisdiction of the CAVC to hear appeals
to review decisions of the Board), § 7266 (setting forth procedures for filing a notice of
appeal). The Secretary may not appeal from a Board decision. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a)
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within 120 days of the Boards decision.34 The CAVC is purely an
appellate court, precluded by statute from making factual
determinations.35 It has the power to affirm, modify or reverse a
decision of the Board or to remand the matter, as appropriate.36
Any aggrieved party at the CAVC may appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit).37 Review in
the Federal Circuit is limited by statute. Specifically, in the absence of a
constitutional issue, the Federal Circuit may review only legal questions;
it specifically is precluded from ruling on a factual determination or on
the application of law to the facts in a particular case.38 Review of
Federal Circuit decisions is available by writ of certiorari in the Supreme
Court.39
3. A Comparison of the Administrative and Judicial Systems
The current system for awarding and reviewing veterans benefits is
truly unique. The system was not one designed from beginning to end at
the same time. Rather, it is the product of the addition of judicial review
on top of the pre-existing administrative system through the VJRA. As I
discuss below in Part II, this oddity of historical evolution most certainly
affects how a veteran experiences the process. And in Part III I discuss
how one can approach solutions to a problem that is, in part, tied to the
manner in which the system evolved.
At this point, however, there is still additional descriptive work to be
done to understand the problems with the system and the possible
solutions to those problems. The administrative portion of the process
from the filing of an application for benefits through consideration of an
appeal by the Board is meant to be one that is non-adversarial and pro-
claimant.40 The Supreme Court recently reiterated that Congress has
made clear its intention that the administrative process is meant to be
something radically different from a traditional adversarial process of
34 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a).
35 38 U.S.C. § 7261(c).
36 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a).
37 38 U.S.C. § 7292.
38 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2).
39 See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (providing for Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction
concerning decisions of the courts of appeals).
40 For a more comprehensive discussion of the non-adversarial features of the
administrative process discussed in the text, see Michael P. Allen, Due Process and the
American Veteran: What the Constitution Can Tell Us About the Veterans Benefits
System, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 501, 507-511 (2011); Rory R. Riley, The Importance of
Preserving the Pro-Claimant Policy Underlying the Veterans Benefits Scheme: A
Comparative Analysis of the Administrative Structure of the Department of Veterans
Affairs Disability Benefits System, 2 VET. L. REV. 77, 83-92 (2010).
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litigation.41 The non-adversarial (and pro-claimant) features of the
veterans benefits system include:
! The VA is required to provide certain notices to claimants
concerning what must be done to establish an entitlement to
benefits. Such notice includes any information, and any medical
or lay evidence, not previously provided to the Secretary that is
necessary to substantiate the claim.42
! Significantly, the VA has a statutory duty to assist claimants in
developing evidence to establish their claims.43
! There is no statute of limitations to file an application seeking
benefits based on a service-connected disability.44
! Principles of res judicata have far less purchase in the
administrative system than they do in general civil litigation
because veterans seeking to revisit rejected claims have the
ability to reopen claims based on the submission of new and
material evidence45 or to attack the earlier decision by alleging
that it was the product of clear and unmistakable error.46
! Whenever positive and negative evidence on a material issue is
roughly equal, the VA is required to give to the veteran the
benefit of the doubt with respect to proof of that issue.47
! The VA is required to sympathetically read a veterans claim
documents.48
! In terms of statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court has
adopted a rule that interpretative doubt is to be resolved in the
veterans favor.49
41 Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1200-07 (2011).
42 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a); see also 38 U.S.C. § 3.159(b) (adopting regulations
implementing the statutory duty to assist).
43 38 U.S.C. § 5103A.
44 See generally Henderson, 131 S. Ct. 1197 (2011).
45 38 U.S.C. § 5108.
46 38 U.S.C. §§ 5109A, 7111. To establish clear and unmistakable error in a decision,
which can be done after the time to appeal has passed, the veteran must show that (1) the
decision was incorrect because either the facts known at the time were not before the
adjudicator or the law then in effect was applied incorrectly, and (2) the outcome would
have been manifestly different if that error had not been made. Russell v. Principi, 3 Vet.
App. 310, 313 (1992) (en banc).
47 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b). The classic CAVC case on the benefit of the doubt doctrine is
Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990).
48 See e.g., Robinson v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1355, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Comer v.
Peake, 552 F.3d 1362, 1369-70 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Szemraj v. Principi, 357 F.3d 1370,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
49 Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994).
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The upshot of these statutory factors is that the administrative
process is quite different from what one is used to in the more traditional
adversary process. However, a more traditional adversary process is
precisely what one finds when one appeals from an administrative
determination to the judiciary process. When one reaches the CAVC and
thereafter the Federal Circuit, the landscape is one that would be familiar
to any lawyer  a traditional American adversarial process.
A final important consideration concerning the current structure of
the veterans benefits system is the role of lawyers in terms of
representing veterans. For much of the history of the United States, there
was a limited role for lawyers in the veterans benefits process. To begin
with, and as mentioned above, it was not until the enactment of the
VJRA in 1988 that there was judicial review (and judges are lawyers
after all) of benefits determinations.50 And it took until 2006 for
Congress to allow lawyers charging a fee to represent claimants prior to a
final Board decision.51 Thus, while the nations commitment to providing
benefits to its veterans is not new, the integration of lawyers in a
meaningful way into that system is still in its infancy. There is no
question that the integration of lawyers into a non-adversarial process has
been a challenge and that challenge has caused some delay in the process
of administrative appellate adjudication. And I will return to that point
below.52
4. The Workload in the System, Delays and the Hamster
Wheel
To say that the veterans benefits system is operating at an
exceedingly high volume is an understatement. From fiscal year 2010
through fiscal year 2014, the ROs in the Veterans Benefits
Administration dealt with over one million claims filed per year.53 In
fiscal year 2014, VA set a record when it processed 1.3 million disability
claims.54 It is difficult to obtain statistics concerning the average time it
takes to process a claim for benefits. The VAs stated goal is to process
all compensation and pension ratings claims within 125 days of receipt
and for the purpose of this essay I will assume the VA does so in the
50 Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 38
U.S.C.).
51 See 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1), enacted as part of the Veterans Benefits Health Care,
and Information Technology Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-461, tit. I, § 101(h), 120 Stat.
3403, 3408.
52 See Part II.B, infra.
53 See Eskenazi Statement, supra note 29, at 5.
54 U.S. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 2014 Performance and Accountability Report at II-
21, available at http://www.va.gov/budget/docs/report/2014-VAparFullWeb.pdf.
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average case.55 Of course, however, as of the VAs most recent report on
the subject, nearly a quarter-million claims remained unadjudicated after
the 125-day goal.56
The historical rate of appeal of initial decision has stayed relatively
constant at approximately 10%.57 Recall that the first step in the appellate
process is when a veteran files an NOD.58 In fiscal year 2014, veterans
filed 137,766 NODs.59 At that point, the RO is required to prepare an
SOC.60 In the last year for which statistics are available, the average time
between the submission of an NOD and completion of the SOC was 295
days.61 Thus, if one assumes that the VA completes the claim within the
125-day goal, a veteran dissatisfied with an RO decision will already
have been waiting for benefit for a total of 420 days on average (125
days initial processing and 295 days waiting for the SOC). And the
veterans appeal will not yet even have been perfected.
After receiving the SOC, the veteran has 60 days within which to
perfect her appeal by submitting a Form-9 to the RO.62 At this point the
veteran is at the mercy of the RO because she must wait for the RO to
certify the appeal to the board. For the most recent year in which
statistics are available, the average time for such a certification was 725
days.63 Our veteran has now waited 1,145 days (125 initial processing,
295 days waiting for the SOC, and 725 days waiting to have the appeal
certified) and her appeal has only just arrived before the Board. The
journey has lasted over three years at this point.64
Once at the Board, the Board reports that the average time until it
reaches a decision is 235 days.65 At this point, then, our veteran has had
55 Id.
56 Id. (reporting 241,991 claims pending beyond 125 days).
57 See Eskenazi Statement, supra note 29 at 7.
58 38 U.S.C. § 7105(a)(b).
59 See Eskenazi Statement, supra note 29 at 5.
60 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(1).
61 Board of Veterans Appeals, 2013 Annual Report at 21, available at http://www.
bva.va.gov/docs/Chairmans_Annual_Rpts/BVA2013AR.pdf (2013 Board Annual
Report).
62 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(3).
63 See 2013 Board Annual Report, supra note 61 at 21
64 If one were to use all data from fiscal year 2013, the time is even longer, amounting
to 1,255 days. See Statement of Baron F. Stichman, Joint Executive Director, National
Veterans Legal Services Program, at 2, Veterans Dilemma: Navigating the Appeals
System for Veterans Claims, Hearing before U.S. House of Rep. Committee on Veterans
Affairs (Jan. 22, 2015), available at http://veterans.house.gov/witness-testimony/barton-
f-stichman-4 (hereinafter Stichman Statement).
65 Id. One can quibble with this statistic because it excludes the time when an appeal is
pending at the Board but a Veterans Service Organization is preparing a written
statement. However, I will use the Boards reported statistic for purposes of this essay.
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her claim pending for 1,380 days, or almost four years. One might
believe that at this point a veteran who remained dissatisfied would
continue her journey by moving into the judicial system. That could
certainly happen, but the more likely outcome at the Board for such a
veteran is that her claim will be remanded to an RO for further
development.66 The average time on remand is 348 days.67 Our veteran
would now be 1,493 days since she filed her claim, or over four years.68
Perhaps the veteran has now been awarded the benefits she seeks.
However, it is more likely that our veteran is now firmly on the so-called
hamster wheel.69 Veterans and those representing them refer to the
system as a hamster wheel because of the multiple remands veterans
experience as they move between the various parts of the system. The
metaphor is truly a powerful one because one can get the sense that there
is much movement without really going anywhere.
In any event, at some point in time the administrative process will
come to an end. If a veteran remains dissatisfied with the result, she may
appeal to the CAVC.70 In fiscal year 2014, 3,745 appeals were filed at
the CAVC.71 The CAVC reported that the median time from filing an
appeal to disposition in 2014 was 286 days. So, if we assume that our
veteran did not step on the hamster wheel, in other words did not have a
remand at the Board level, her claim would not have been in the
adjudication process for 1,666 days, over four and half years. One
reaches this figures by adding the initial processing time (125 days) to
the time preparing the SOC (295 days) to the time waiting for
certification of the appeal (725 days) to the time for a Board decision
(235 days) to the median time for disposition of an appeal at the CAVC
(286 days). I have not included the time that could be associated with an
appeal from the CAVC to the Federal Circuit. In fiscal year 2014 just
66 For the most recent fiscal year in which statistics are available, 45.8% of Board
decisions concerning disability compensation resulted in a remand, the highest category
of resolution by far. See 2013 Board Annual Report, supra note 61 at 24.
67 Id. at 21.
68 The Boards current leadership recognizes the role that remands play in the
resolution of veterans claims. See Eskenazi Statement, supra note 29 at 1, 5.
69 The hamster wheel metaphor is standard fare in the veterans law world. See, e.g.,
Stichman Statement, supra note 64 at 6 (noting that [f]or nearly a decade now, those
who regularly represent disabled veterans before the VA and CAVC have been using an
unflattering phrase to describe the system of justice that veterans face once they appeal a
VA regional office decision denying a claim for service-connected disability benefits:
the hamster wheel.).
70 38 U.S.C. §§ 7252, 7266.
71 United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, 2014 Annual Report at 1,
available at http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/FY2014 AnnualReport06MAR15
FINAL.pdf (hereinafter 2014 CAVC Annual Report).
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under 150 appeals were filed in the Federal Circuit in veterans law
cases.72
Even this rather staggering statistic concerning the time it takes to
resolve a veterans claim for benefits is deceptive. The hamster wheel
continues at the CAVC. In fiscal year 2014 there were 3,686 dispositions
of appeals at the court.73 Over 71% of those dispositions involved at least
a partial remand, with 26% of the dispositions being a remand in full.74
The end result of this saga is that the four and half year journey described
above is actually the best-case scenario for a veteran who does not
prevail at the agency. The reality can often be far worse. Part II considers
why it is that veterans face these delays given our strong commitment to
honoring those who served.
II. CAUSES OF DELAY: A SURPRISING DOWNSIDE OF A
COMMITMENT TO VETERANS
The previous Part described the current structure of the system by
which veterans benefits are awarded and reviewed. What should be
clear from that discussion is that the veterans benefits system is unique
and that veterans face serious challenges  and associated delays  in
obtaining the benefits to which they are entitled. This Part turns to a
consideration of the causes of those delays in particular. One is tempted
to place the blame for the delays (and other difficulties) associated
with obtaining veterans benefits on factors such as administrative
inefficiency or, perhaps inappropriately, a desire by VA officials to deny
benefits as a policy matter. As to the latter point, I simply do not believe
VA officials actually wish to harm deserving veterans. If one were to
take that view of the situation, there is a far more fundamental problem at
play. As to the former point, there is no question that there is inefficiency
72 See United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Appeals Filed in Major
Origins, available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/the-court/statistics/
caseload_by_major_origin_2005-2014.pdf. The median time for the disposition of an
appeal from the CAVC at the Federal Circuit in fiscal year 2014 was 10 months. See
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Median Time to Disposition in
Cases Terminated After Hearing or Submission, available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.
gov/images/stories/Statistics/med%20disp%20time%20merits_table.pdf.
73 See 2014 CAVC Annual Report, supra note 71, at 1.
74 Id. 957 matters were remanded as the only remedy. 979 matters involved a partial
affirmance of the Board as well as a remand. Finally, 693 matters involved a partial
reversal of the Board along with a remand. For further discussion of remands at the
CAVC, see James D. Ridgway, Why So Many Remands?: A Comparative Analysis of
Appellate Review by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, 1
VETERANS L. REV. 113 (2009).
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in the process. No system this large can be entirely efficient. But there
are far more interesting causes for the delays veterans are facing.
This Part highlights four systemic causes of delay beyond those
mentioned above, causes that in my view are often overlooked in the
discussion. Those four areas are: (1) Congress amazing substantive
generosity to veterans and their families; (2) the ad hoc development of
the veterans benefits system that led to its current structure; (3) the wide
array of procedural protections provided to veterans; and (4) the complex
nature of the law underling the provision of veterans benefits.
A. The Substantive Generosity of Congress
There is nearly universal agreement that the nation owes an
incredible debt of gratitude to the men and women who choose (or who
were selected) to serve in the armed forces. They make it possible for the
entire country to live the extraordinary lives we get to live. And
Congress has recognized the service these men and women have
provided by providing an extraordinarily broad range of benefits to
which they are entitled.75 In my estimation, Congress decision to make
the broad range of benefits to veterans and their families is the right thing
to do as a matter of policy. But that correct and honorable decision
comes with a cost. That cost is the necessity to have a system by which
those benefits are administered. This truly fundamental point  fidelity to
President Lincolns call  is often overlooked.
Correspondingly, the management of the wide array benefits
Congress has made available to veterans and their families requires by its
very nature a large bureaucracy. No matter how one feels about so-called
big government, it requires a great many people to review millions of
claims for benefits submitted each year and many more to provide the
review of those initial decisions. There is no doubt that there are
inefficiencies in the VA. However, for now the point is that a cause of
some of the problems with veterans benefits determinations is related to
the incredibly expansive list of benefits veterans can access. The balance
of this Part discusses those issues.
B. The Ad Hoc Development of the Veterans Benefits System
Another significant cause of the delays in resolution of veterans
initial applications and appeals of benefits denials can be traced to the ad
hoc development of the benefits system itself and the various
consequences that flow from that development. As one will recall from
75 See e.g., 2014 Performance and Accountability Report, supra note 9.
2014-15] JUSTICE DELAYED; JUSTICE DENIED? 15
the summary of the system set out above,76 the system we have today is
the result of additions over a long period of time. It is as if one had built
a house with many additions over the years but there was no conscious
planning of what the residence should ultimately look like. The structure
works as a house but not in the way in which it would have had it been
planned at a single time. And VA has recognized the reality that the
development of the current system has led to delays at all levels of the
system.77 In this sub-section, I briefly highlight some of the ways in
which the ad hoc development of the benefits system contributes to
current delays.
To begin, the system includes two dramatically different segments: a
non-adversarial administrative structure onto which a traditional judicial
system has been grafted.78 Moreover, the engrafting of that judicial
superstructure came only after many years in which the administrative
structure existed in isolation. This part of the systems development
causes delay in several respects.
First, there is a disconnect between the two parts of the system for
veterans as they move from the non-adversarial process to the
traditionally adversarial judicial process. This transition can be a difficult
one for unrepresented veterans who have grown accustomed to being
assisted in the development of their claims. None of the pro-claimant
features of the system discussed above apply when the veteran reaches
the CAVC.
Second, even after over a quarter-century of the presence of courts in
the process, it does not appear that all of the actors in the administrative
system have fully accepted judicial review.79 Some of this resistance may
be conscious. But leaving that aside, it also seems that even after more
than twenty-five years there is not a sufficiently well-developed means
by which legal ruling are communicated to front line adjudicators in a
timely and understandable manner. The result of this state of affairs is
that errors occur that could be avoided and those errors will also lead to
likely needless remands to apply the correct legal rule.80 These remands
in turn add to the length of time it takes for an appeal of an
76 See supra Part I.
77 See Eskenazi Statement, supra note 29 at 3 (Judicial review has significantly
complicated VAs administration of its benefits programs, resulting in significant delays
in adjudicating the initial claim and the appeal processes. The processes that were
developed in the decades after World War I were not designed to be compatible with
judicial review. As a result, interpretation of statutes and regulations that often date to
World War I or World War II has led to many unexpected results that have been difficult
to integrate into the decades of procedures that have accumulated.).
78 See supra Part I.B.
79 See Eskenazi Statement, supra note 29 at 3-4.
80 See supra Part I.B.4.
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administrative decision to be fully resolved based on the correct legal
principles.
Third, even if there were not resistance (conscious or unconscious) to
the imposition of judicial review, the complex body of law imposed on
the administrative process is being implemented in the first instance by
non-lawyers. This reality means that errors in adjudications are most
certainly likely to occur, requiring correction on appeal.
Fourth, some delay in the current system can be tied to requirements
Congress has imposed on various actors in the process. For example,
Congress made the decision to create the CAVC as an appellate body and
specifically precluded that body from making factual determinations.81
The decision to have judicial review of veterans benefits decisions
vested in an appellate tribunal and the corresponding restriction on
making factual determinations have an important consequence. The
CAVC will often find an error the Board has committed but conclude
that the proper remedy is to remand the matter so that the Board may
conduct the appropriate fact-related exercise. In other words, this
structural feature of the system is a critical component of the so-called
hamster wheel on which so many veterans find themselves.82
Related to the point concerning the appellate nature of the CAVC,
Congress has required that the Boards decisions contain: a written
statement of the Boards findings and conclusions, and the reasons and
bases for those findings and conclusions, on all material issues of fact or
law presented on the record. . .83 The rationale for doing this is two-
fold. We want the veteran to understand why the Board has reached its
conclusions. We also want to make sure that a court can meaningfully
review the Boards actions. However, this requirement is also a
component of the hamster wheel because so-called reasons and bases
errors are extraordinarily common.84 When the CAVC determines that
there is a lack of reasons or bases (or as is also common, the parties on
appeal agree that the Boards decision lacks a sufficient statement of
reasons and bases), the only recourse is a remand. At that point it seems
quite likely that the Board will issue another decision reaching the same
result but with more explanation. That, in turn, will lead to another
appeal to the CAVC. The wheel continues to turn.
In addition, Congress made a determination to include two-levels of
as-of-right judicial review of administrative decisions. As described
above, a dissatisfied claimant has a right to appeal a final Board decision
81 See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 7261(c).
82 See supra Part I.C (discussing delays in the system and the hamster wheel effect).
83 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1).
84 See, e.g., Ridgway, Why So Many Remands?, supra note 74 at 136-138.
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to the CAVC. Either party then has a right of appeal to the Federal
Circuit.85 As far as I am aware, this is the only example in federal
practice of two levels of as-of-right appellate review. There is no
question that the inclusion of the Federal Circuit in the chain if review
adds to delays in the appellate process. Most obviously, in cases
appealed to that court the appellate process is lengthened by definition as
the court considers the appeal. However, more systemically the presence
of an additional layer of review contributes to delay by making the law
less stable. Of course, this recognition does not mean that having the
Federal Circuit as a part of the process is necessarily a bad thing. If there
is some goal that the courts inclusion supports  for example a strong
concern for error correction plain and simple  having two levels of
review might be appropriate. But with that extra layer of review
necessarily comes delay.
Finally, yet another aspect of the ad hoc development of the current
system that contributes to delay concerns the presence of lawyers in the
administrative system. As described above, Congress has provided that a
claimant may retain a lawyer for a fee as soon as he or she receives an
initial RO decision on a claim.86 This was a significant change in the
system that had historically disfavored the assistance of counsel. The
greater use of lawyers in the administrative system has the potential to
reduce delays in the appellate process because lawyers will be better
positioned to assemble evidence that complies with the complex law at
issue. However, that potential is being undercut by a resistance (or at
least a perceived resistance) to counsel by administrative adjudicators at
all levels of the system. The result of such resistance means not only that
the reductions in delays that could accompany the greater introduction of
lawyers in the system are not being realized, but ironically greater delays
are being introduced as administrative adjudicators and counsel engage
in peripheral battles over the presence of lawyers themselves.
C. Procedural Protections Provided Claimants
As I have mentioned above, Congress has been quite generous to
veterans in terms of the benefits they are entitled to receive.87 Ive
explained how that generosity itself is, ironically, a part of the delays in
receipt of benefits. A related concept is that in addition to being generous
in the types of benefits available, Congress has also been generous in
85 38 U.S.C. § 7292.
86 See 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1).
87 See supra Part II.A.
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providing procedural protections to claimants in the system.88 I have
outlined above a non-exhaustive list of the procedural protections
veterans have in the system.89
These procedural protections are important to veterans. However,
with any additional layer of procedure comes a corresponding period of
delay. For example, with each additional hearing comes time to prepare,
have the hearing, and eventually render a decision. And with the duties
of notice and assistance, a finding that such a duty has not been complied
with will almost always lead to a remand. Indeed, allowing a veteran to
submit additional evidence throughout the appeal process is a benefit to a
veteran but also adds delay as the new evidence needs to be processed.90
None of this is to say that the procedural protections provided to veterans
are a bad thing. It is simply to note that the more procedure one affords,
the longer a process will take from start to finish all other things being
equal.
D. Legal Complexity
A final cause of delays in the administrative system concerns the
complexity of the law in the area of veterans benefits. As Judge Lance
of the CAVC has written, [t]here is an unfortunate  and not entirely
unfounded  belief that veterans law is becoming too complex for the
thousands of regional office adjudicators that must apply the rules on the
front lines in over a million cases per year.91 If Judge Lance is correct 
and I believe he is  delays are going to inevitably result. And it is worth
noting that if the law in this area is becoming too complex for RO
adjudicators to apply, how much more of a problem is that for claimants
who may not have the benefit of legal counsel.
Delays flow from legal complexity in at least two respects. First, it
simply takes time for a legal ruling issued by the Federal Circuit or the
CAVC to be communicated to adjudicators in a manner that allows it to
be applied. Second, even when communicated, the complexity of legal
doctrine is such that errors are inevitably a part of the process. Those
88 The Federal Circuit has also held that applicants for veterans benefits have a
property interest in those benefits from the moment they apply such that the
Constitutions Due Process Clause applies. Cushman v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1290 (Fed.
Cir. 2009). I have discussed the constitutional issues more directly in Allen, Due Process,
supra note 40.
89 See supra Part I.B.3.
90 See, e.g., Eskenazi Statement, supra note 29 at 9 (Appellants, at no cost and without
limitation, may submit additional evidence at any time during the pending appeal,
regardless of whether the appeal is at the VBA or the Board, and the VBA must generally
reevaluate the claim based upon the new evidence.).
91 Delisio v. Shinseki, 25 Vet. App. 45, 63 (2011) (Lance, J., concurring in the
judgment).
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errors need to be corrected on appeal at some point and these corrections
often lead to remands.92 Those remands, in turn, can lead to further
appeals lengthening the time to resolution of claims. This point has been
recognized by the current leadership of the Board who has told Congress
that the legal complexity of the system has made timely resolution of
veterans claims more difficult.93
As with many of the causes of delay I have discussed, there is a
positive attribute behind the scenes. The introduction of judicial review
has unquestionably led to the legal complexity that is a part of the
increased delay in resolving claims. But judicial review has also brought
great benefits to the system of veterans benefits. I have discussed these
benefits in other venues and will not repeat them here.94 My point at this
juncture is that one has to recognize that while extensive delays in
resolving claims is unquestionably not a good thing, some level of delay
is part and parcel of alterations to the system that have been a good thing.
III. WHAT CAN BE DONE? SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT POTENTIAL
SOLUTIONS
It should be clear by this point that veterans face significant obstacles
in connection with obtaining the benefits to which they are entitled. The
veterans benefits system is complex, overburdened, and in many
respects structured in an accidental manner. The system has developed
over decades with different parts being grafted onto structures
established years before.95
I have written elsewhere about what I consider to be the best way in
which to address the systemic problems veterans face in connection with
obtaining their benefits: there should be a commission (or similar group)
whose charge it is to consider the system from stem to stern with fresh
eyes.96 Such a commission would bring together representatives of all the
relevant constituencies, including veterans, VA employees, and
92 See generally supra Part I.B.4.
93 See Eskenazi Statement, supra note 29 at 3-4 (Specifically, the applicable law as
developed primarily by precedential CVAC and Federal Circuit decisions is constantly
increasing in complexity. As a result of this legal complexity and the open record, it has
become increasingly challenging to complete an appeal or to reach a final decision in an
appeal.).
94 See Michael P. Allen, The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims at
Twenty: A Proposal for a Legislative Commission to Consider its Future, 58 CATHOLIC
U. L. REV. 361, 372-77 (2009) (discussing benefits of judicial review of veterans
benefits determinations) (hereinafter Legislative Commission).
95 See generally supra Part I.
96 See generally Allen, Legislative Commission, supra note 94.
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congressional and judicial representatives.97 In many respects, the
commission would start with a blank page on which it could design a
veterans benefits system that makes sense globally and takes into
account the various values the constituencies deem to be important.98
I continue to believe the commission is the best way to systemically
address the issues veterans face with the timely adjudication of their
benefits claims. However, it may be the case that political realities make
such a comprehensive review impossible. There are many powerful
stakeholders who care deeply about veterans. Yet this fact may mean that
we are stuck with status quo writ large because so many different
factions have their own views about the best way in which to proceed.
Working under the assumption that the political landscape will not
allow a comprehensive systemic reimagining of the veterans benefits
system  or at least not soon  we need to consider a second best
solution. The secondary approach is one that approaches the situation in
a targeted manner. As described above, veterans face significant delays
in the resolution of their claims.99 These delays are the result of a
complex mix of factors, not the least of which is the procedural and
substantive generosity Congress has shown to veterans as a group.100 If
the entire system cant be redesigned, we should focus on small parts of
the system that can (or likely would) reduce delays. Such a focused
approach is most certainly not as advantageous as the comprehensive
review, but it is perhaps the best that can be done under the present
circumstances.
The balance of this Part provides illustrations of targeted changes in
the system that could help address the problems veterans face in terms of
delay. These suggestions are by no means an exhaustive listing of the
changes that could be made. They are merely examples. This part
proceeds by discussing changes a several levels of the current system:
the initial submission of claims; the administrative appeal process; and at
the stage of judicial review. Changes in each segment are discussed in
turn.101
97 Id. at 388-90 (discussing the constituencies that should be included and the
importance of having a comprehensive group of representatives).
98 Id. at 390-92 (discussing values the commission should consider as part of its work).
99 See supra Part I.B.4.
100 See supra Part II.
101 Not every suggestion discussed above can be neatly placed into one portion of the
system. There is overlap. This Part separates the various suggestions largely for
administrative convenience. Moreover, I do not discuss two rather obvious means to
address delays in adjudication. The first is providing additional resources in terms of
either budget and/or personnel. More resources would certainly help, but it is by no
means a panacea. Money does not address the underlying issues. Second, enhanced
training, particularly at the RO level, is critically important. If the law is complex, the
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A. Initial Submission of Claims
Not to be pedantic, but an excellent place to start to address the
delays veterans face is at the beginning. If one can reduce delays at the
ROs stage of the process, the length of time it takes to adjudicate a claim,
whether it is initially granted or denied, will be reduced. This sub-part
discusses three changes at the initial claims adjudication process that
should be considered as part of a targeted strategy to reduce delays:
greater use of presumptions to establish service-connection; greater
involvement of lawyers in the initial claims process; and establishing
techniques to allow greater means of obtaining information concerning
particularly relevant matters.
1. Greater Use of Presumptions
When a process has inputs exceeding one million claims per year,102
anything that can be done to streamline the resolution of such claims is
likely to have a positive impact on the overall claims processing timeline.
As discussed above, one of the significant causes of delay in the current
system is the complexity of the law, especially after the institution of
judicial review.103 For each claim, and the associated multiple issues in
those claims, an RO adjudicator must make factual findings and apply
the law to the facts. If one were able to streamline this process at the
frontend it would allow both for quicker adjudication as well as
potentially lead to a reduction in error rates because the law to be applied
would be less complex.
An example of how one could accomplish this feat already exists.
The standard means of establishing service-connection whether on a
direct or secondary basis is for a veteran to affirmatively establish a
current condition, an in-service event or occurrence, and a nexus between
those two things.104 However, for certain types of claims Congress has
determined that a veteran may establish certain of these elements base on
statutory presumptions. An example of this approach concerns exposure
to the defoliant Agent Orange and the myriad conditions medical science
indicates are correlated with such exposure. Under current law, a veteran
will be presumed to have been exposed to Agent Orange is she
established she was in Vietnam during a specified period of time in the
more education RO-level adjudicators have the better. Again, however, this potential
solution  at least standing alone  does not address the root causes of the delay.
102 See supra Part I.B.4 (providing statistics concerning initial filing of claims).
103 See supra Part II.D.
104 See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131 (2011); see also Washington v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.
App. 362, 367 (2005), citing Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995), affd 78 F.3d
604 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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1960s and 1970s.105 This presumption allows a veteran to establish an in-
service event  exposure  without the need to actually prove the
exposure. Thereafter, a second level of presumptions come into play.
Congress has provided that once a veteran has shown (either directly or
by presumption) an exposure to Agent Orange, certain conditions are
presumed to have been the result of such exposure.106 In other words,
there is a presumption of nexus.
The combined effect of these Agent Orange presumptions is
veteran-friendly and also conducive to easier adjudication of a claim. An
RO adjudicator need not delve into factual question concerning exposure
or medical evidence dealing with causation. The result of these
presumptions is a more efficient and less complex adjudicatory process
and one that should increase the speed of initial adjudications.
It would be possible to extend the use of presumptions beyond the
very complex situation of Agent Orange. Indeed, my suggestion is to use
presumptions in exactly the opposite types of situations: common,
garden-variety high volume claims. Take one example: A common
claims for service-connected disability is hearing loss. At present, one
adjudicates a claim for hearing loss in the tradition way: the veteran has
to establish she has hearing loss; that there was some in-service event;
and that the in-service event caused the current hearing loss. Making
these determinations take time. But that time is really not well-spent.
Many people working in the military are around loud noises all the time
and often in conditions that do not allow the use of hearing protection:
the artillery specialist; a person working in the engine room of a
submarine; the aircraft mechanic. The list goes on and on. Why should
we require the time and effort for RO adjudicators to spend time to
address these situations?
Hearing loss presents a classic example of a claim for which a
presumption would streamline the RO process. Why not have a rule in
which certain military occupations107 will presumptively establish
service-connection for hearing loss? Under such a regime, all a veteran
would have to establish is that she has a current diagnosis of hearing loss.
If she had a certain MOS that was listed as presumptively correlated with
hearing loss, the veteran would be deemed to be presumptively service-
connected just as the Agent Orange veteran is. Imagine how much time
that would save for these claims by RO adjudicators. And of these claims
105 38 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (1991); 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6) (1992).
106 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(ii) (1992).
107 The term often used to designate a military occupation is MOS  Military
Occupation Specialty.
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take less time, the adjudicators would have more time to deal with other
veterans claims.
I believe this suggestion can have a dramatic impact on how RO
adjudicators deal with their workload. There are two issues that make
this suggestion problematic. First, in order to implement this suggestion
concerning the greater use of presumptions, Congress must act.
Presumptions are established by Congress. Second, one must decide
which conditions are appropriate for a presumption. That exercise takes
time and judgment. Nevertheless, there is a great opportunity for
Congress to address the systemic problem of the adjudication of
veterans claims by using its power to develop means of presumptive
service-connection.
2. Greater Involvement of Lawyers
One of the true anomalies in the current veterans benefits system is
that the administrative process is one Congress designed to be non-
adversarial but in which Congress has also now provided for greater
involvement by lawyers.108 There is no question that the introduction of
lawyers into this non-adversarial system has been a challenge. Indeed, as
I mentioned above, it may be one of the causes of some of the delays.109
Ironically, however, I also believe that greater use of lawyers can reduce
delays if all the relevant constituencies work together.
First, Congress should remove the current bar preventing a veteran
from hiring a lawyer for a fee prior to an initial decision by the RO.110
With that current bar in place, a veteran will only get the assistance of a
lawyer after she has already had her claim denied (or otherwise not fully
granted). Thus, if we assume that the denial was erroneous, an attorney
will only be able to bring his or her legal training to bear on an issue after
a veteran has lost. Take for an example a situation in which a veterans
claim is lacking probative evidence of the nexus between a current
disability and an in-service event. A lawyer trained in evidence and
understanding the complexity of veterans law will be much better
position than the veteran to see such a deficiency in proof. Of course, the
lawyer can correct the problem by obtaining the relevant evidence.
However, if the lawyer had been involved from the beginning, he or she
would have been able to ensure that the evidence was there for the initial
108 See Part I.B.3 (discussing both the non-adversarial nature of the administrative
system as well the introduction of lawyers into that system).
109 See supra Part II.B.
110 See 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1), enacted as part of the Veterans Benefits Health Care,
and Information Technology Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-461, tit. I, § 101(h), 120 Stat.
3403, 3408.
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adjudication instead of only after the veteran had waited for the
erroneous denial.
But merely providing veterans with the ability to hire a lawyer from
the beginning of the claims journey is not enough. The VA, Veterans
Service Organizations (VSO),111 and the private bar need to work
together to develop means by which lawyers can be fully integrated into
the non-adversarial administrative system. Lawyers have skills that are
useful in veterans law. Lawyers are trained to understand complex legal
doctrines and to assemble evidence to meet the elements of a given
claim. Those skills do not require that a particular process be adversarial.
It does require, however, that all involved be receptive to lawyers being
involved in a non-adversarial process.
To begin with, the VSOs and the private bar need to learn to work
together far more effectively. With over a million claims filed each year,
there is no shortage of veterans needing assistance. The skills lawyers
possess are going to be important for certain claims. For example, claims
concerning PTSD or military sexual trauma are complex and often
require significant evidence to establish certain elements of service-
connection.112 This is precisely the type of claim for which a lawyers
special skills are ideally suited. At the same time, other claims are not as
complex (either factually or legally). For these claims, VSOs may be a
veterans best option. So long as these two groups representing veterans
treat each other with suspicion, veterans will not be served.
Second, members of the private bar need to approach their role in the
system with some creativity. As I have mentioned, lawyers have skills
that are well-suited to the type of questions often at issue in veterans
benefits claims. But lawyers will not be effective in advancing the
interest of their clients if they approach using their skills as if they were
in a traditional litigation system. Instead, lawyers have to think about
their role in the administrative system as if they were working in tandem
with the VA employees who are adjudicating the claim.
Of course, if lawyers are going to work in tandem with the VA, they
will need a partner. This means that the VA should embrace the role of
lawyers in the system. Congress has made clear that veterans have the
111 VSOs are various organizations that provide services and support to veterans. Such
organizations include the Vietnam Veterans of America, Disabled American Veterans,
and the American Legion to name just a few. See 2013/2014 Directory of Veterans and
Military Services Organizations, available at http://www.va.gov/vso/VSO-Directory
_2013-2014.pdf (listing VA approved VSOs). VSO also represent claimants in the
benefits process through non-attorney representatives.
112 See Veterans Benefits Manual, supra note 10, at § 3.6 (discussing PTSD claims
including those related to military sexual trauma).
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ability to have a lawyer involved at a certain point in the process.113 The
agency should exercise its rule-making authority make it easier for
lawyers to assist veterans using their special skillset.114 The next sub-part
discusses one of the most important areas in which such rules would be
useful. At the very minimum, however, the VA must not be an antagonist
to lawyers. Doing so ignores Congress direction and ultimately
disserves veterans.
3. Greater Use of Devices to Obtain Information
There is no question that evidence matters in the veterans benefits
system. A veteran seeking service-connected compensation must
establish a current disability, an in-service event, and a connection or
nexus between the two.115 Thus, the coin of the realm in many
veterans benefits matters is medical evidence. Whether it is establishing
a current disability or (more likely) the nexus between an in-service
event and a current disability, medical evidence and opinions are often
what matters. The problem for veterans is that, rather ironically some
might say, because the benefits system is non-adversarial and pro-
claimant, there are few means by which a veteran can test the medical
evidence upon which the RO or the Board relies.
Either Congress by statute or the VA by regulation could adopt a
system by which veterans could test the evidence they VA has developed
concerning the claim. One can see the importance of such information-
gathering devices by considering a recent case the Federal Circuit
considered. Parks v. Shinseki concerned a claim related to exposure to
chemicals as part of a secret mission in the military.116 Not surprisingly,
a key issue was whether the veterans current disabilities were related to
his exposure to chemicals while in service. The RO sought a medical
examination to address this issue and ultimately obtained an opinion
from a nurse practitioner.117 The nurse-examiner concluded that it was
less likely than not that the exposure caused the conditions.118 The RO
ruled against the veteran, a determination that was ultimately affirmed by
both the Board and the CAVC.119
113 See 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1), enacted as part of the Veterans Benefits Health Care,
and Information Technology Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-461, tit. I, § 101(h), 120 Stat.
3403, 3408.
114 See 38 U.S.C. § 501 (2011) (providing rulemaking authority to VA).
115 See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131; supra note 104.
116 Parks v. Shinseki, 716 F.3d 581, 582 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
117 Id. at 583.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 583-84.
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On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the central issue was whether the
nurse-examiner was sufficiently qualified to have rendered the opinion
she gave. More specifically in this case, it was whether the evidence was
competent medical evidence.120 The Federal Circuit first held that a
rebuttal presumption of regularity applied in this area in that a court
would assume that the RO (or Board) followed a regular process when
selecting the examiner.121 But this presumption is rebuttable; the veteran
has to submit information that the examiner is not qualified or at least
information sufficient to raise the issue.122
The Federal Circuit never reached the question of whether the nurse
in Parks was competent to render the opinion at issue. Instead, the court
noted that the veteran never raised any issue about the nurse-examiners
qualifications.123 Thus, the decision was one based on waiver.
Parks is important in its own right. However, for purposes of this
essay the key point is what it can mean for being an advocate for a
veteran. The Federal Circuit has made clear that if a veteran wants to
preserve a challenge to the qualifications of a medical examiner, he or
she must raise that issue at the RO (or Board). But how does one have a
basis to do so if no one has to provide information about the examiner in
the first place?
My answer to this question is that the veteran is entitled to access to
the sort of information that would provide a good faith basis on which to
raise a competency challenge. Whether we call it discovery,
disclosure, or transparency, the fact is that there is no way in which
Parks makes sense without a veteran having the means to obtain the
information that is necessary to prevent the waiver the Federal Circuit
found in that case. And either Congress or the VA can make this a
reality. Either way, a procedure to test the sufficiency of the evidence is
critical.
This point is reinforced by the Federal Circuits holding that
applicants for veterans benefits have a constitutionally protected
property interest under the Due Process Clause in their claim for benefits
from the moment of application.124 As such, veterans are entitled to
certain procedural protections in respect to their claims.125 In my
estimation, Parks allows veterans advocates  as well as the VA -- a
120 Id. at 584.
121 Id. at 585.
122 Id.
123 Parks, 716 F.3d at 586.
124 Cushman v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
125 See generally Allen, Due Process, supra note 40 (for a more detailed discussion of
Cushman).
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means to bring life to Cushman as well as to explore the more general
issues concerning access to information in the veterans benefits process.
The reality is that Parks shows how the adoption of information
gathering devices can make the process more efficient. Take this as an
example:
Step 1: We know from Parks that while there is a presumption that
the RO or the Board used a correct process to select a competent medical
examiner, that presumption is rebuttable.
Step 2: One cannot rebut the presumption (or really even have an
ethical basis to challenge the qualifications of the examiner) without at
least basic information about his or her qualifications.
Step 3: If access to such basic information is not provided in the pro-
claimant, non-adversarial veterans system that would raise serious
concerns under Cushman.
Step 4: Therefore, there must be some means to obtain the
information.
This line of argument has the advantage of being both incredibly
simple and also essentially self-evident. And if that is the case, the key
issue then becomes how one seeks this information in a manner that
preserves a claim of error later in the process. There are a number of
devices that could be used by advocates to either obtain information or
preserve error. The simplest is to use what in civil practice would be
termed interrogatories, or questions posed to another party in a formal
litigation.126
That would leave the question of what to request in such
interrogatories. Again, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide at
least some guidance. Rule 26(a)(2)(B) provides a list of information
concerning testifying expert witnesses that must be provided to the
opposing party automatically. Much of that information is almost
axiomatically required in the veterans context if (a) the veteran must
affirmatively challenge the examiners qualifications and (b) the
Constitutions Due Process Clause applies. To list just some examples,
Rule 26 calls for disclosure of the following:
! a complete statement of all opinions the witness will
express and the basis and reasons for them;127
! the facts or data considered by the witness in forming [the
opinions];128
126 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33.
127 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(i).
128 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(ii).
28 U. MIAMI NATL SECURITY & ARMED CONFLICT L. REV. [Vol. V:1
! the witnesss qualifications, including a list of all
publications authored in the previous 10 years.129
My point here is not to draft a sample set of interrogatories or even
to propose a more general means of obtaining information in the
benefits process. Rather, my suggestion is that Congress or the VA
could use their lawmaking or regulatory power in a way to change
procedures to affect delays.130
B. Administrative Appeals
There are also targeted steps that can be taken in connection with the
administrative appeal process to reduce the delays in the adjudication of
claims. There is perhaps nowhere else in the process in which the tension
between procedural protections for veterans and the reduction of delays
in adjudication is more apparent. As I have described above, Congress
has created an administrative process that is riddled with procedural
protections for veterans.131 It may be that changes in the administrative
review process is where one truly has to confront the divide between a
desire for procedural protections and speed of adjudication
In this sub-part, I discuss several procedural changes at the Board
level that could help reduce the delays veterans are experiencing. To be
sure, it is possible to view any one of these changes as reducing
procedural protections afforded to veterans. If ones primary goal is to
maintain as much procedure as possible, adopting these changes will not
be attractive. But if one is interested in reducing delays in adjudication
while maintaining the appropriate procedural safeguards, these
suggestions should be considered. This sub-part considers two steps that
could be taken at the administrative appeal level: elimination of the SOC;
and allowing the Board to engage in factual development.
129 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(iv).
130 The CAVC recently had the opportunity to explore how much information gathering
a veteran (or her advocate) should be entitled to as a matter of Due Process. See Nohr v.
McDonald, 27 Vet. App. 124 (2014). In that case, the veteran had propounded a number
of interrogatories to the VA concerning the qualifications of a doctor who had
submitted a medical opinion. Id. at 127-28. The CAVC ultimately avoided ruling on the
constitutional question by holding that the veterans interrogatories essentially called into
play the examiners qualifications such that the VAs duties to the veteran required
further investigation. Id. at 131-34. Accordingly, the CAVC remanded the matter for
further adjudication, leaving the more general information-gathering question unresolved.
Id. at 134-35.
131 See supra Part I.B.3 (summarizing certain of the pro-claimant procedural protections
for veterans).
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1. Elimination of the SOC
As I have described above, the process by which a veteran perfects
her appeal is a multi-stage one.132 The veteran must submit an NOD.133
As a result, the RO prepares the SOC.134 Then, the veteran must file a
form to formally initiate the appeal.135 If all that was involved here was
filing forms, there would not be a cost-savings in terms of time. But there
is much more at stake here. On average, it takes the RO approximately
295 days to prepare the SOC.136 If one were able to eliminate that time
from the process, veterans would be able to have their administrative
appeal considered much more quickly.
The material contained in the SOC is certainly relevant to the initial
decision.137 In other words, the RO adjudicator at the initial phase should
certainly be considering why the applicable law dictates the result based
on the facts presented. If that is the case, why then should the function
the SOC performs be combined with the information conveyed in the
initial decision? How much more is this the case if doing so would
eliminate almost 300 days from the appeal process? This is a simple,
almost cost-free, means to reduce delay.138
2. Factual Development at the Board
As has been discussed at several points, one of the major problems in
the current system is the prevalence of remands.139 One part of this
remand cycle is when the Board determines that the RO has failed to
obtain adequate evidence concerning an issue. When that situation
occurs, the Board remands the matter to the RO to develop the evidence,
often a medical opinion.140 Delays could likely be reduced if the Board
were able to conduct such further development itself.
132 See supra Part I.B.1.
133 38 U.S.C. § 7105(a), (b)(1)-(2) (2012).
134 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(1) (2012).
135 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(3) (2012).
136 2013 Board Annual Report, supra note 61 at 21.
137 See 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(1)(A)-(C) (2012) (setting forth requirement for SOC).
138 The National Organization of Veterans Advocates has also proposed eliminating
the SOC requirement. See Veterans Dilemma: Navigating the Appeals System for
Veterans Claims: Hearing before U.S. House of Rep. Committee on Veterans Affairs, at
9-11 (Jan. 22, 2015) (statement of Kenneth M. Carpenter, Esquire, Founding Member,
National Organization of Veterans Advocates), available at http://veterans.house.gov/
witness-testimony/kenneth-m-carpenter.
139 See supra Part II.C.
140 See Eskenazi Statement, supra note 29 at 5 (discussing delays caused by Board
remands to the RO to develop evidence). In reality, the Board will often remand the
matter to a centralized organization within the Veterans Benefits Administration known
as the Appeals Management Center. See, e.g., Stichman Statement, supra note 64 at 10.
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The general idea would be that resources could be shifted from
segments of the Veterans Benefits Administration to the Board. Thus,
such realignment, while certainly not without cost, would likely not be
cost-prohibitive. When a Board Member determines, for example, that a
medical examination was inadequate, she would be able to have a
supplemental examination conducted without the administrative process
of remanding the matter to another entity within the VA.
This suggestion is a part of a current bill pending in the United States
House of Representatives, the Express Appeals Act.141 It is part of a
larger pilot project that would create a special class of appeals into which
a veteran could opt. These express appeals would be resolved without
a veteran being able to submit new evidence.142 The concept of an
express appeal process is one that is controversial. Some see it as a
positive thing because it provides additional options to veterans.143
Others view the proposal with skepticism because they see it has
undermining important procedural protections afforded to veterans.144 I
do not take a position on the larger bill in this essay. Its present
importance is that the shifting of development from the RO to Board
dovetails with one of the targeted changes to the system that would be
beneficial.145 And in doing so, there appears to be some political will to
make this change.
C. Judicial Review
The final stage of the veterans benefits is the process of judicial
review inaugurated by the VJRA. As outlined above, a veteran who has
been denied the benefits she seeks by a Board decision may appeal to the
For present purposes, that technical distinction makes no meaningful difference. For
additional information concerning the Appeals Management Center, see Veterans
Benefits Manual, supra note 10 at § 13.10.
141 H.R. 800, 114th Cong. § 2(c)(4) (2015).
142 Id. at § 2.
143 See, e.g., Veterans Dilemma: Navigating the Appeals System for Veterans Claims:
Hearing before U.S. House of Rep. Committee on Veterans Affairs, at 15-17 (Jan. 22,
2015) (statement of Gerald T. Manar, Deputy Director, National Veterans Service,
Veterans of Foreign Wars), available at http://veterans.house.gov/witness-testimony/mr-
gerald-t-manar-1; Veterans Dilemma: Navigating the Appeals System for Veterans
Claims: Hearing before U.S. House of Rep. Committee on Veterans Affairs, at 12-15 (Jan.
22, 2015) (statement of Mr. Paul R. Varela, Assistant National Legislative Director,
Disabled American Veterans), available at http://veterans.house.gov/witness-testimony/
mr-paul-r-varela-1.
144 See, e.g., Stichman Statement, supra note 64, at 9-10.
145 Others have also supported this change in the locus of the development of evidence
on appeal. See, e.g., Stichman Statement, supra note 64 at 10-11.
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CAVC.146 Thereafter, either party who loses before the CAVC may
appeal as of right to the Federal Circuit, subject to that courts limited
scope of review.147 There are steps that can be taken at the stage of
judicial review that can affect the overall time within which veterans
claims are resolved. This sub-part discusses three possible changes to the
system: greater use of the CAVC to reverse decision of the Board as
opposed to merely remanding such matters; reconsidering the role of the
Federal Circuit in the process; and adopting a form of aggregate issue
resolution technique.
1. Greater Reversal at the CAVC
There is no question that one of the significant features of the
hamster wheel of veterans benefits adjudication is the rate at which
cases are remanded.148 One significant reason for such remands is the
CAVCs reluctance to engage in statutorily prohibited fact-finding. So,
for example, the CAVC will conclude that the Board made a certain error
(often because of the provision of insufficient reasons and bases).149
Having found such an error, the CAVC will almost always remand the
case to the Board to adjudicate the appeal in the first instance.150 No
doubt, this course of action will often be correct so long as the CAVC is
prohibited from making factual determinations in the first instance.
However, I believe the CAVC (either on its own initiative or at the
direction of Congress) could be more aggressive in using its power to
reverse the Board as opposed to remanding a matter.
Specifically, I have suggested elsewhere that the CAVC should
adopt a form of hypothetical clearly erroneous review.151 Under this
approach, the court would ask whether on the state of the evidence in the
record if the Board had made a factual finding against the claimant,
would the court have been left with the definite and firm conviction that
146 See 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a) (2011) (setting forth the jurisdiction of the CAVC to hear
appeals to review decisions of the Board); see also 38 U.S.C. § 7266 (2012) (setting forth
procedures for filing a notice of appeal).
147 38 U.S.C. § 7292 (2012).
148 See supra Part I.B.4 (discussing remands at all levels of the system including the
CAVC).
149 See, e.g., Ridgway, Why So Many Remands?, supra note 74, at 136-38.
150 See, e.g., Deloach v. Shinseki, 704 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (affirming CAVC
decision to remand instead of reverse); Byron v. Shinseki, 670 F.3d 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(affirming CAVC decision to remand instead of reverse).
151 SeeMichael P. Allen, Commentary on Three Cases from the Federal Circuit and the
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims as We Approach Twenty-Five Years of Judicial
Review of Veterans Benefits, 5 VETERANS L. REV. 136, 150-55 (2013).
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a mistake has been committed.152 The CAVC uses such a standard to
assess actual findings of fact the Board has made.153 It is true that the
proposal would be for a hypothetical review of a finding of fact not
actually made. My point, however, is that if the court were to conclude
that on the face of the record existing before the court a finding of fact
adverse to the veteran would be clearly erroneous, it seems that there is
no need for a remand.154 I have not attempted to assess empirically how
much of an effect such hypothetical clearly erroneous review would
have, but I suspect it could have a not insignificant impact over the run
of appeals. At the very least, this change in appellate review would likely
have a positive effect on the overall time veterans face in the appellate
process.
2. The Role of the Federal Circuit
When Congress established judicial review in connection with
veterans benefits determinations, it created a system that is unique in the
federal judiciary. Judicial review in the veterans benefits context is the
only situation in the federal judicial system in which there are two levels
of appellate court review as of right. At the time Congress enacted the
VJRA it may have made sense to include the Federal Circuit in the
process. After all, Congress created the CAVC under its Article I powers
and there was at the time no law of veterans benefits due to the pre-
existing prohibition on judicial review of veterans benefits
determination.155
Regardless of whether the initial constitution of system made sense,
times have changed. We now have over 25 years of the development of
veterans benefits law. Perhaps it is now time to consider whether the
Federal Circuit continues to play a meaningful place in the system.
Congress could streamline the current system by removing the Federal
Circuit from the process of judicial review. Such a change would mean
that an Article I court, the CAVC, would have its decisions reviewable
only by a writ of certiorari. This is not an issue. The United States Court
152 See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948) (setting forth
federal standard for clearly erroneous review of factual findings actually made).
153 See, e.g., Byron v. Shinseki, No. 09-4634, 2011 WL 2441683, at *4 (U.S. App. Vet.
Claims June 20, 2011) (non-precedential single-judge memorandum opinion).
154 I note here that engaging in such a hypothetical exercise is not unknown to the
CAVC. It does something similar when it takes due account of the rule of prejudicial
error in assessing whether an administrative error would have affected the ultimate
outcome in the matter at hand. See 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(2) (2012).
155 See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing advent of judicial review under the VJRA).
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of Appeals for the Armed Forces is in the same position.156 Congress
could remove the Federal Circuit from the process and, thereby, reduce
the time for appeal.
3. Aggregate Issue Resolution
A third issue that could affect delays in the system concerns the lack
of a procedural mechanism by which the CAVC can address multiple
claims in a single setting. There should be a means of utilizing aggregate
resolution of issues on appeal either by means of a CAVC adopted rule
of procedure or congressional direction. The general concept would be to
have a procedural device similar to the class action device in general
civil litigation.157
The CAVC has ruled in a number of decisions that it lacks the
authority to resolve issues using a procedure akin to a class action in
general civil litigation.158 Whatever the merits of those decisions, I
believe that adopting such a procedural approach could reduce delays in
adjudication on a systemic basis. If the court we able to formally
adjudicate an issue that had binding legal effect on hundreds or
thousands of cases, I firmly believe that the process of adjudication
would be streamlined.159 For example, if a claimant sought an order
concerning a delay in adjudicating her claim for benefits, she could
proceed as a representative on behalf of all others similarly situated. And
in any event, it seems inconceivable that such a procedure would add to
delays in adjudication.
IV. CONCLUSION AND CALL TO ACTION
I began this essay by recounting Abraham Lincolns call to action
concerning Americas veterans. Nothing I had said should be seen as
critical of this countrys commitment to President Lincolns vision.
Indeed, it may be that we have collectively been so committed to
veterans that the men and women who have served in the armed forces
are facing some of the problems I have discussed.
156 The history and jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces is set forth on that courts website. See About the Court, United States Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces, http://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/newcaaf/about.htm.
157 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
158 See, e.g., American Legion v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 1 (2007) (en banc) (holding
that court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate claims brought by an organization as opposed
to an individual veteran); Lefkowitz v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 439 (1991) (rejecting
contention that court had the authority to adjudicate class actions).
159 Others have also made this suggestion. See, e.g., Stichman Statement, supra note 64,
at 12-14.
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What is clear today is that we need to take a new look at how we
honor those who have protected our freedoms, something at very great
cost to them. I have outlined some possible solutions that can alleviate
the unacceptable delays veterans face in obtaining the benefits available
to them. Those in power or who have the ability to consider these steps
should do so. But more importantly, we need to be engaged in a
comprehensive national discussion about how we can make President
Lincolns vision a reality in our modern world.
